Volitional control matters greatly for moral judgment: Coerced agents receive less condemnation for outcomes they cause. Less well understood is the psychological basis of this effect. Control may influence perceptions of intent for the outcome that occurs or perceptions of causal role in that outcome. Here, we show that an agent who chooses to do the right thing but accidentally causes a bad outcome receives relatively more punishment than an agent who is forced to do the ''right" thing but causes a bad outcome. Thus, having good intentions ironically leads to greater condemnation. This surprising effect does not depend upon perceptions of increased intent for harm to occur, but rather upon perceptions of causal role in the obtained outcome. Further, this effect is specific to punishment: An agent who chooses to do the right thing is rated as having better moral character than a forced agent, even though they cause the same bad outcome. These results clarify how, when and why control influences moral judgment.
Introduction
Charles Whitman murdered his wife and mother on a July night in 1966. The following morning he continued the killing spree, climbing a clock tower and using a large arsenal of rifles to indiscriminately murder passersby below. His spree left 13 dead and 32 wounded.
1 If Whitman was in control of his behavior then nobody could be more deserving of punishment. Yet, in an unusual suicide note Whitman professed love for his family and regret for the deeds he was about to commit. He described the recent onset of strangely violent thoughts, and requested an autopsy to determine whether there was an abnormality in his brain. There was: His autopsy revealed a growing tumor that impinged on a cluster of subcortical structures. Suppose, then, that Whitman's behavior was in some sense beyond his control. As heinous as his actions were, would this fact change our desire for retribution? Many past studies suggest that it would: Agents who lack control over their behavior receive less condemnation for harms they cause (Alicke, 2000; Cushman, Dreber, Wang, & Costa, 2009; Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Darley, 1995) . But, what is it about lacking control that lessens moral judgment? In other words, what is the psychological basis of this effect? One intuitively appealing possibility is that control impacts moral judgment through representations of intentionality. If a person strikes another during a seizure, for instance, their lack of control indicates that they likely did not cause harm intentionally. This inference follows because behavioral control implies a correspondence between intention and outcome, while a lack of control makes a mismatch possible. Returning to Whitman's case, potentially we forgive him because viewing his actions as uncontrollable leads us to assume that he lacked a culpable mental state-i.e., an intention, desire, motive, etc. to kill. Indeed, this connection between intentionality and control is well documented (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Weiner, 1995) .
Yet, Whitman's case seems a poor example of this mechanism. His behavior was intentional in any ordinary sense of the word: He meticulously planned and then executed an attack on nearly fourdozen people, murdering 13 of them. Rather, it feels intuitively as if the tumor ''made" Whitman murder, by forcing him or robbing him of alternative courses of action. In other words, Whitman's lack of control seems to deprive him of causal responsibility for the crime. It wasn't really Whitman who did it-his diseased brain did.
This illustrates an alternative possibility: That control influences moral judgment by modifying ascriptions of causal responsibility. Past research clearly demonstrates that moral judgment is sensitive to a person's role in causing harm, in addition to the role played by their intent to cause harm (Cushman, 2008; Guglielmo, Monroe and Malle, 2009; Piaget, 1965; Weiner, 1995; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007) . Yet, there is less prima face appeal to the possibility that we forgive uncontrollable action because we don't hold an actor causally responsible for it. After all, we routinely apply the concept of causal responsibility to inanimate http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.11.008 0010-0277/Ó 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
